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Anonymous E-Cash was first introduced in 1982 as a digital, privacy-preserving alternative to physical cash.
A lot of research has been since then devoted to extend and improve its properties, leading to the appearance
of multiple schemes. Despite this progress, the practical feasibility of E-Cash systems is still today an open
question. Payment tokens are typically portable hardware devices in smart card form, resource constrained
due to their size, and therefore not suited to support largely complex protocols such as E-Cash. Migrating to
more powerful mobile platforms, for instance smartphones, seems a natural alternative. However, this im-
plies to move computations from trusted and dedicated execution environments to generic multi-application
platforms, which may result in security vulnerabilities. In this work we propose a new anonymous E-Cash
system to overcome this limitation. Motivated by existing payment schemes based on MTM (Mobile Trusted
Module) architectures, we consider at design time a model in which user payment tokens are composed of
two modules: an untrusted but powerful execution platform (e.g. smartphone) and a trusted but constrained
platform (e.g. secure element). We show how the protocol’s computational complexity can be relaxed by a se-
cure split of computations: non-sensitive operations are delegated to the powerful platform, while sensitive
computations are kept in a secure environment. We provide a full construction of our proposed Anonymous
Split E-Cash scheme and show that it fully complies with the main properties of an ideal E-Cash system.
Finally, we test its performance by implementing it on an Android smartphone equipped with a Java Card
compatible secure element.
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1. INTRODUCTION
As the importance of electronic payments in today’s ubiquitous society continues to
grow, so does users’ awareness on the amount of personal information that is involved
in financial transactions. These data can be easily collected and analyzed by banks
and/or vendors for purposes unrelated to the actual transaction, the most common one
being direct marketing techniques. Enforcing a correct use of the information once it
has left the users’ control seems utopian, as there is no realistic way to prevent data
from being distributed, stolen, and essentially further (mis-)used. More troublesome
is the fact that sensitive personal information might inherently be stored within pay-
ment transaction databases: sexual orientation and political views might be inferred
from a user’s list of purchases, medical conditions can be exposed by analyzing a set
of procured medications, and precise location is often revealed in scenarios where elec-
tronic payments are tied to physical locations, e.g. in public transportation systems. In
all these scenarios there is a clear need for alternative electronic payments aiming to
conceal, or at least minimize, the disclosure of sensitive information.
Privacy-preserving electronic payments have been known to be possible since 1982,
when David Chaum introduced the concept of anonymous E-Cash [Chaum 1983].
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Briefly speaking an anonymous E-Cash system is composed of three players: a cen-
tral bank, a set of merchants (or vendors), and a set of users (or buyers). Users can
withdraw a wallet of electronic coins from the bank, and they can later spend these
coins by purchasing goods from a merchant. At the end of the purchase transaction,
the merchants can deposit the collected coins into their bank account.
From a functional point of view this procedure is similar to existing off-line (non-
anonymous) payment systems such as Proton [PROTON 2014] (in Belgium), Chip-
knip [Chipknip 2014] (in the Netherlands), or Geldkarte [Geldkarte 2014] (in Ger-
many). From a privacy point of view however, an anonymous E-Cash system ensures
some additional properties, namely:
(1) User anonymity: It is not possible for a merchant to learn the identity of a user
during or after a purchase transaction.
(2) Payment unlinkability: It is not possible for a merchant to determine whether two
or more purchase transactions correspond to the same or different user(s).
(3) Coin unlinkability: It is not possible for a bank to conclude whether a coin with-
drawn by a user corresponds to a coin deposited by a merchant.
These strong privacy properties can obviously not conflict with other generic secu-
rity requirements of off-line payments, for instance prevention of coin double-spending
and coin double-depositing. E-Cash protocols are designed such that system misuse
invalidates the privacy guarantees. For instance, users that double-spend a coin are
automatically detected and their anonymity is revoked. Similarly, vendors attempting
to double-deposit coins can be exposed and identified.
Another similarity between anonymous and non-anonymous payment systems is the
necessity of a portable payment token on the user side. The role of this token is not
only to store secret cryptographic materials, but also to carry out payment transac-
tions in a secure fashion. A tamper resistant element, for instance a smart card with
controlled execution environments, is often used to safeguard the system against cor-
ruption efforts from malicious participants. The security of these trusted elements is
certified by evaluation labs in numerous Common Criteria [Common Criteria 2014]
and EMVCo [EMVCo 2014] certifications before being accepted into the banking mar-
ket.
Unfortunately, the high complexity of anonymous E-Cash systems leads to more
stringent implementation costs than non-anonymous schemes. As a consequence, cur-
rent standalone payment tokens appear insufficiently powerful to support the com-
plex protocols employed in E-Cash. In this work we devise a new anonymous E-Cash
scheme that does not require a fully tamper resistant element on the user side to per-
form all operations. Instead, it takes inspiration from Mobile Trusted Module (MTM)
architectures and considers at design time a payment token composed of two indepen-
dent embedded computing platforms: an untrusted but powerful execution platform
(mobile phone) and a trusted but constrained computation module (secure element).
Our system is designed such that the computational complexity at the user side is
securely split into two platforms.
1.1. Related Work
The introduction of Chaum’s anonymous E-Cash led to the subsequent appearance
of systems that achieved new and interesting properties. Among them, Camenisch et
al. [Camenisch et al. 2005] proposed compact E-cash, a system that greatly improved
the computational and storage requirements for withdrawing and storing electronic
coins. Okamoto [Okamoto 1995] investigated the concept of divisible E-cash, allow-
ing users to divide the value of a digital coin to spend it in multiple times. Later,
Canard and Gouget [Canard and Gouget 2007] proposed the first divisible off-line E-
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Cash scheme with both unlinkability and anonymity without trusted third party. Fur-
ther works building on the ideas of [Camenisch et al. 2005] introduced other properties
such as coin endorsement [Camenisch et al. 2007] or coin transferability [Canard et al.
2008; Canard and Gouget 2008].
In parallel to this, there have also been efforts to evaluate the feasibility of anony-
mous E-Cash systems and their cryptographic building blocks on hardware platforms.
An important line of work has focused on implementations of anonymous credential
systems such as the Identity Mixer (IDEMIX) [Camenisch and Lysyanskaya 2001;
Camenisch and Herreweghen 2002]. A variant of the Direct Anonymous Attestation
(DAA) protocol [Brickell et al. 2004] is implemented by Balasch [Balasch 2008] on an
8-bit AVR microcontroller. Similar schemes are presented by Sterckx et al. [Sterckx
et al. 2009] and by Bichsel et al. [Bichsel et al. 2009], both running on standard Java
Card smart cards. An implementation of the U-Prove credential system [Brands 2000]
on a MULTOS smart card platform is described by Mostowski and Vullers [Mostowski
and Vullers 2011]. Finally, implementations of self-blindable credentials due to Ver-
heul [Verheul 2001] on Java Card platforms are presented by Batina et al. [Batina
et al. 2010].
An implementation of the E-Cash scheme due to Brands [Brands 1994] is presented
by Clemente-Cuervo et al. [Clemente-Cuervo et al. 2007]. The authors use a PDA
equipped with a 400 MHz Xscale processor as target device. The same scheme is
implemented by Hinterwa¨lder et al. [Hinterwa¨lder et al. 2013a] on a dedicated Moo
RFID tag [Hong Zhang 2011] equipped with a Texas Instruments MSP430F2618 16-
bit processor. Further works have investigated the use case of anonymous ticketing for
NFC mobile phones, for instance, Derler et al. [Derler et al. 2011] and Hinterwa¨lder et
al. [Hinterwa¨lder et al. 2013b].
In contrast to these works, our work considers the mobile phone as untrusted plat-
form and therefore unsuitable to be used as a standalone payment token. We conse-
quently look for another approach, namely assume the existence of a trusted device
that collaborates with the phone in order to carry out payment transactions. We stress
that this architecture is not novel, i.e. the concept of MTM acting as a trusted anchor in
mobile platforms already exists. In fact, it is used by several existing mobile payment
applications. Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) such as Google or Apple em-
ploy in-built secure elements as trust anchors of their payment applications Google
Wallet and Apple Pay, respectively. Similarly, Visa payWave [Visa payWave 2014] is
only available to mobile phones certified by Visa which contain, among others, a Visa
approved hardware and software secure container. Finally, other companies make use
of SIM cards as trusted elements present in the phone. This is the case for instance of
the Mobile PayPass application from MasterCard.
1.2. Our contribution
The main contribution of our work is to bring MTM models as currently used by (non-
anonymous) payment applications to the world of anonymous E-Cash systems. For
this, we propose a new anonymous E-Cash system specially suited for MTM architec-
tures. Our system, which we call Anonymous Split E-Cash, is a variant of the compact
E-Cash scheme of Camenisch et al. [Camenisch et al. 2005]. The main difference is
that calculations on the user side are split into two independent computing platforms
that communicate with each other. Non-sensitive operations, i.e. those which do not
rely on secrets and/or critical payment information, are carried out in a powerful but
untrusted device, e.g. an embedded controller running an operating system. Sensitive
operations on the other hand are performed on a less powerful but completely trusted
element providing strong security guarantees. The key challenge of our approach lies
in determining where and how to efficiently split the computations between these two
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elements. For this we follow a similar approach as in the Direct Anonymous Attesta-
tion (DAA) protocol [Brickell et al. 2004] employed in Trusted Platform Module (TPM)
systems.
Our proposed system complies with the main properties of existing e-cash schemes,
namely correctness, user anonymity, payment unlinkability, detection of double
spenders, and balance correctness of the bank. Additionally, it fulfills properties to
protect the trusted element from a corrupt device: withdraw authorization, withdraw
completion, spend authorization and spend completion. They ensure that a corrupt
device cannot withdraw and spend coins without authorization from the trusted el-
ement. In order to determine to what extent the proposed E-Cash system can lead
to realizable implementations, we also evaluate the performance of a proof-of-concept
implementation. As target device we select a combination of off-the-shelf devices: an
Android based smartphone (playing the role of the powerful, untrusted environment)
and a certified Java Card secure module (playing the role of the computational CPU in
the trusted element).
2. HIGH-LEVEL DESCRIPTION
Figure 1 illustrates the three parties that interact with each other in our anonymous
E-Cash system: a bank B, a merchant M and a user U . We distinguish operations
performed by the user depending on whether they are executed on the host H or on
the secure element SE . The host is a relatively computationally powerful device owned
by U . As depicted in the figure, we envision H to be a smartphone. Mobile phones
play nowadays a central role in people’s lives, which makes them a suitable choice
for our system. Due to their multi-application architecture and the large amount of
stakeholders involved in their manufacturing and deployment, we naturally consider
them untrusted in our E-Cash construction and only take advantage of their powerful
computational capabilities. The security assurances are instead placed on SE , a less
powerful platform connected to H that stores secret parameters and only carries out
operations depending on such parameters.
For security reasons, it is necessary that there exists a direct link between the hu-
man user and SE . This is a consequence of our model. BecauseH is an untrusted entity,
communication between the human user and SE cannot be simply relayed through H.
In other words, SE cannot be fully integrated withinH. If that were the case, the infor-
mation exchanged between the human user and SE could be altered or simply blocked.
Moreover, H could try to execute withdraw and spend transactions without involving
the human user, leading to undesired corruption scenarios.
In order to solve these issues, we envision SE to be a relatively small custom pay-
ment token that externally plugs to H. This payment token would be provided by
B to U upon engagement in the E-Cash application, similarly to today’s smart card
based electronic payments. Communication between H and SE takes place via the em-
ployed external phone interface, for instance, a micro USB port. Additionally, SE comes
equipped with means to directly interface to U . We envision a simple yet sufficient in-
terface composed of two main components: a small LCD module and a few push but-
tons. The LCD module is used to visually inform the user of the requests and amounts
involved in each transaction. The push buttons on the other hand, allow the user to
initiate the main E-Cash operations (withdraw and spend) as well as to confirm/reject
transactions. Additionally, other push buttons such as increase/decrease could be used
to modify the number of coins involved in the transaction.
Besides these changes in the user domain, interactions between anonymous E-Cash
parties are similar to those of existing off-line payment schemes. An initialization
setup phase allows to generate and distribute cryptographic keys and parameters to
all participating parties. In the first step U and B execute together a withdraw protocol.
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Fig. 1. Anonymous E-Cash for resource constrained devices.
As a result, U obtains a wallet composed of n coins. The withdrawal step is executed in
such a way that H obtains only partial information about the wallet, thus preventing
H from spending coins without SE ’s approval. In the second step, U and M run the
spend protocol in which U transfers a coin of a certain wallet toM. Finally in the third
step,M sends a coin to B via the deposit protocol to store it in its bank account. Be-
fore B accepts the coin, it checks that neither the coin has already been deposited nor
that U has committed double spending. If both checks turn negative, B deposits the
coin in M’s bank account. Otherwise B does not accept the coin and runs the accuse
protocol. In case of a double-deposit, B marksM as double depositor; in case of double-
spending, B is able to revoke U ’s anonymity and to issue a publicly-verifiable proof of
double-spending.
2.1. Security Framework
The security of a protocol ϕ is analyzed by comparing the view of an environment Z in
a real execution of ϕ against that of Z when interacting with an ideal functionality F
that carries out the desired task. The environment Z chooses the inputs of the parties
and collects their outputs. In the real world, Z can communicate freely with an adver-
sary A who controls the network as well as any corrupt parties. In the ideal world, Z
interacts with dummy parties, who simply relay inputs and outputs between Z and F ,
and a simulator S. We say that a protocol ϕ securely realizes F if Z cannot distinguish
the real world from the ideal world, i.e., Z cannot distinguish whether it is interacting
with A and parties running protocol ϕ or with S and dummy parties relaying to Fϕ.
The identity of a party consists of a party identifier pid and a session identifier sid .
A set of parties are a protocol instance if they have the same session identifier sid .
A protocol ϕG securely realizes F in the G-hybrid model when ϕ is allowed to invoke
the ideal functionality G. Therefore, for any protocol ψ that securely realizes function-
ality G, the composed protocol ϕψ, which is obtained by replacing each invocation of an
instance of G with an invocation of an instance of ψ, securely realizes F .
Our protocol makes use of the functionalities FREG for key registration, FSMT for se-
cure message transmission, and FASMT for anonymous secure message transmission.
We refer to [Camenisch et al. 2014] for the description of those ideal functionalities.
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2.2. Ideal Functionality
To describe how our anonymous split E-Cash system should act we describe an ideal
functionality FASEC. FASEC interacts with the following dummy parties: the bank B,
the secure elements SE1, . . . ,SEI , the hosts H1, . . . ,HI and the vendors M1, . . . ,MJ .
The parties are dummy in the sense that they just forward their inputs to FASEC.
Based on these inputs, FASEC calculates the desired output and forwards this output
to each of the parties it is interacting with.
The identifier Ui denotes a pair (SE i,Hi). Our functionality assigns a unique identi-
fier to wallets and coins. Each wallet is denoted by (Ui, w) such that w ∈ [1, wi], where
wi is a counter of the number of wallets of Ui. Each coin is given an identifier (Ui, w,
cn), where cn specifies a coin counter that is used to distinguish between coins in the
wallet w.
Our functionality stores all the relevant information into a table Table I. Table I
assigns to each coin (Ui, w, cn) a unique random identifier P . P is a coin pseudonym
given to the vendorsMj and to the bank B, and cannot be linked to the user that spent
that coin. Additionally, Table I contains a list of transaction identifiers, one for each
time the coin was spent. Each transaction identifier is associated to the identity of the
merchant that received the coin at that transaction, and a bit that indicates whether
the coin obtained with that transaction identifier was deposited at the bank or not.
Table I. An entry in the table of FASEC.
(Ui, w, cn) P [id1,Mj,1, b1], . . . , [idM ,Mj,M , bM ]
We depict the ideal functionality FASEC and discuss the interfaces of FASEC:
Functionality FASEC
Running with a bank B, vendors M1, . . . ,MJ , hosts H1, . . . ,HI and secure el-
ements SE1, . . . ,SEI , and parameterized with a number of coins per wallet N ,
FASEC works as follows:
(1) On input (setup, sid) from B, FASEC executes the following program:
— Continue only if sid = (B, sid ′) and if Table I is not initialized.
— Initialize an empty table Table I. For i = 1 to I, initialize to zero a wallet
counter wi. Send a public delayed output (setupend, sid) to B.
(2) On input (withdraw, sid) from SE i, FASEC executes the following program:
— Continue only if sid = (B, sid ′).
— Send (withdraw, sid) to S and wait for (withdraw, sid) from S.
— IfHi or B is corrupt, send (withdraw, sid ,SE i) to S and wait for (withdraw, sid ,
b) from S. If b = 0, send (withdrawend, sid , 0) to SE i and exit the program.
— Increment the counter wi and initialize to zero a coin counter cn for wallet
wi of user Ui.
— Send (withdrawend, sid , wi) to SE i and (withdrawend, sid ,SE i) to B.
(3) On input (spend, sid , w,Mj) from SE i, FASEC runs the following program:
— Continue only if sid = (B, sid ′) and w ∈ [1, wi].
— Increment the counter cn for wallet w of user Ui. Continue only if cn ≤ N or
if SE i is corrupt.
— If SE i is corrupt, send (spend, sid) to SE i and wait for (spend, sid , cn) from
SE i.
— Send (spend, sid) to S and wait for (spend, sid) from S.
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— If Hi is corrupt, send (spend, sid ,SE i) to S and wait for (spend, sid , b, c) from
S. If b = 0, send (spend, sid , 0) to SE i and exit the program.
— If Mj is corrupt, send (spend, sid) to S and wait for (spend, sid , id) from S,
else create a unique transaction identifier id.
— If there is not an entry [(U ′i , w′, cn ′),⊥,⊥] in Table I such that U ′i = (SE i,Hi),
w′ = w and cn = cn ′, create a random unique P and append a new row
[(Ui, w, cn), P, [id,Mj , 0]] to Table I, else add a new tuple [id,Mj , 0] to the
entry [(Ui, w, cn),⊥,⊥].
— If c = 0 and Hi is corrupt, send (spendend, sid , P, id,SE i) to Mj , else send
(spendend, sid , P, id) toMj . Send (spendend, sid , P, id) to SE i.
(4) On input (deposit, sid , P, id) fromMj , FASEC executes the following program:
— Continue only if sid = (B, sid ′) and there is a row [(Ui, w, cn), P ′, [id′1,M′j,1,
b1], . . . , [id
′
M ,M′j,M , bM ]] in Table I such that both P = P ′ and there is tuple
[id′m,M′j,m, bm] such that id′m = id andM′j,m =Mj .
— Send (deposit, sid) to S and wait for (deposit, sid) from S.
— If in the tuple [id′m,M′j,m, bm] such that id′m = id andM′j,m =Mj mentioned
above, bm = 1, send (depositend, sid ,Mj , P, id,ddepositalert) to B.
— Else, for all the tuples [id′1,M′j,1, b1], . . . , [id′M ,M′j,M , bM ] in the same row
in Table I, if bm = 1 for any m ∈ [1,M ], send (depositend, sid ,Mj ,Ui, P, id,
dspentalert) to B and set bm = 1 in the tuple [id′m,M′j,m, bm] such that id′m =
id andM′j,m =Mj .
— Else, set bm = 1 in the tuple [id′m,M′j,m, bm] such that id′m = id andM′j,m =
Mj and send (depositend, sid ,Mj , P, id) to B.
(5) On input (accuse, sid ,Ui, P, id, iˆd) from any party P, FASEC runs as follows:
— Continue only if sid = (B, sid ′) and there is a row [(U ′i , w, cn), P ′, [id′1,M′j,1,
b1], . . . , [id
′
M ,M′j,M , bM ]] in Table I such that U ′i = Ui, P = P ′ and there are
two tuples [id′k,M′j,k, bk] and [id′m,M′j,m, bm] such that id′k = id and id′m = iˆd.
— In those tuples [id′k,M′j,k, bk] and [id′m,M′j,m, bm], if bk = bm = 1, send
(accuseend, sid , guilty) to P, else send (accuseend, sid ,notguilty) to P.
(1) The setup interface is called by the bank B. First, FASEC checks if sid = (B, sid ′).
This check allows each bank to have its own instance of the e-cash protocol. FASEC
initializes an empty table Table I and a wallet counter wi for each secure element
SE i.
(2) The withdraw interface is called by a secure element SE i. First FASEC asks the sim-
ulator S permission to continue through the message (withdraw, sid). This models
the fact that, in the real protocol, the adversary controls the network and there-
fore is able to stop or delay withdraw requests. Second, when the host or the
bank are corrupt, FASEC also asks permission to continue through the message
(withdraw, sid ,SE i), this time including the identity of the secure element. Finally,
FASEC creates a new wallet for Ui, initializes the coin counter for that wallet and
informs the secure element and the bank that the wallet is created. We note that,
for simplicity, all the wallets have the same number N of coins.
(3) The spend interface is called by a secure element SE i on input a wallet w and a
merchantMj . First, FASEC checks that the wallet exits and that it has not run out
of coins. If the secure element SE i is corrupt, FASEC allows SE i to choose which
coin should be spent or double-spent. Second, FASEC asks the simulator S permis-
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sion to continue. Third, if the host Hi is corrupt, FASEC sends the identity SE i
to the simulator S and S tells FASEC whether it allows the spend request to pro-
ceed (b 6= 0) and whether the identity SE i should not be revealed to the merchant
(c 6= 0). Then, FASEC creates a new transaction identifier id or receives id from
a corrupt merchant. If the coin (Ui, w, cn) was never spent, FASEC creates a new
coin pseudonym P and stores a new row in Table I, else FASEC adds a new tuple
[id,M, 0] to the existing row for coin (Ui, w, cn) in Table I. Finally, FASEC sends
the pseudonym P and the transaction identifier id to the merchant, along with the
identity SE i if the corrupt host requested that. FASEC sends P and id to SE i.
(4) The deposit interface is called by a merchantMj on input a coin pseudonym P and
a transaction identifier id. First, FASEC checks that the merchantMj has received
a coin with a pseudonym P and a transaction identifier id. Second, FASEC asks the
simulator S permission to continue. Then FASEC checks if the coin with pseudonym
P and a transaction identifier id has already been deposited, and in that case,
deposits the coin with the bank and alerts the bank of a double-depositing. Else,
FASEC checks if the coin with pseudonym P was already deposited under other
transaction identifiers, and if it is the case, sends it to the bank, alerts the bank of
a double spending, and marks the coin as deposited. Else, if none of the conditions
applies, FASEC marks the coin as deposited and sends it to the bank.
(5) The accuse interface is called by any party P on input a user Ui, a coin pseudonym
P and transaction identifiers id and iˆd. FASEC checks whether the coin with
pseudonym P belongs to Ui and was deposited with transaction identifiers id and
iˆd. In that case, FASEC tells P that Ui is guilty, and otherwise that Ui is not guilty
of double-spending.
FASEC guarantees the same security properties as traditional E-Cash schemes in
which U is not divided into two entities. It guarantees balance correctness, anonymity,
unlinkability, exculpability and identification of double-spenders. Additionally, the
ideal protocol provides extra security properties to protect SE i from a malicious Hi:
withdraw authorization, withdraw completion, spend authorization and spend com-
pletion. A short description of all these properties follows:
— Balance correctness. No coalition of malicious merchants M and users U can de-
posit more coins than the ones they previously withdrew. When M deposits a coin
through (deposit, sid , P, id), FASEC checks whether the coin P was already deposited.
If it was deposited with the same transaction identifier id , then FASEC informs the
bank that the merchant is double-depositing the coin. If it was deposited with a dif-
ferent transaction identifier, FASEC informs the bank that the user double-spent the
coin.
— Anonymity and Unlinkability. No coalition of malicious B and M can revoke U ’s
anonymity, link the spending of a coin to its withdrawal, or link two spendings to
the same entity. FASEC sendsM and B a random value P and transaction identifier
id to identify the coin when it is spent and deposited. P and id reveal no information
about the wallet the coin belongs to or the user that spends the coin. U ’s anonymity
can be revoked if U double-spends a coin. A malicious H can also reveal U ’s identity.
— Exculpability. No coalition of malicious B and M can falsely accuse U of double
spending. When a party P sends (accuse, sid ,Ui, P, id, iˆd), FASEC checks whether the
coin P belongs to Ui and has been deposited twice with transaction identifiers id and
iˆd and only in that case tells P that the user is guilty.
— Identification of double-spenders. If a coin P is deposited at the bank with a trans-
action identifier id and the coin P was deposited before with a different transaction
identifier, FASEC sends B the identity of the user that double-spent the coin.
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— Withdraw Authorization. Hi cannot withdraw wallets without SE i’s authorization.
FASEC only accepts withdraw requests from the secure element SE i.
— Withdraw Completion. Hi cannot prevent SE i from obtaining a wallet after it was
withdrawn. FASEC informs both SE i and B that a wallet is withdrawn by sending
the messages (withdrawend, sid , wi) and (withdrawend, sid ,SE i) respectively. There-
fore, FASEC ensures that, if an honest B receives confirmation that a wallet was
withdrawn by a secure element SE i, then SE i receives that wallet. Nevertheless,
a corrupt Hi can prevent SE i from withdrawing wallets, but in that case the bank
does not receive any confirmation that a wallet was withdrawn.
— Spend Authorization. Hi cannot spend a coin without SE i’s authorization. FASEC
only accepts spend requests from the secure element SE i.
— Spend Completion. Hi cannot prevent a coin spent by SE i from being received by
the merchant Mj . FASEC informs both SE i and Mj that the spend operation is
completed. Nevertheless, Hi can prevent SE i from spending coins. In this case,Mj
does not receive a coin and SE i does not receive any confirmation that the coin was
spent toMj .
3. CONSTRUCTION OF ANONYMOUS SPLIT E-CASH
In this section we present a construction of our system based on the compact E-Cash
scheme by Camenisch et al. [Camenisch et al. 2005]. The reason to choose this protocol
as basis is five-fold. First of all, only a limited number of interactions with the bank are
required. Second, it fulfills the first four properties of the ideal functionality presented
in Sect. 2.2. In other words, the system is designed such that even after corruption of
a user, the security properties of bank and merchant remain the same. Third, the com-
pact E-Cash scheme is both memory and time efficient. Fourth, it employs commonly
known cryptographic primitives, which is of importance when pursuing an implemen-
tation on commercially available devices. And last of all, the original scheme has a
potential to be split up into a host and a secure element part.
We give in the following a detailed description of our system. Recall that the system
contains three types of players: a bank B, merchants M and users U . We distinguish
operations performed by a user U depending on whether they are executed on the (un-
trusted) host platform H or on the (trusted) secure element SE . The protocol consists
of five phases: setup, withdraw, spend, deposit and accuse. For brevity, when a party
communicates with another party, we indicate whether this communication is handled
through FSMT or FASMT without showing how these functionalities are invoked.
3.1. Setup Phase
On input (setup, sid), B executes the following steps:
(1) Continue only if sid = (B, sid ′) and if a key pair (skB , pkB) is not stored.
(2) Generate a special RSA modulus n = ab with safe primes a = 2a′+1 and b = 2b′+1,
such that a, a′, b, b′ are all prime numbers and the resulting n has 2k bits, where k
is the security parameter.
(3) Pick generators Z,Q, V1, . . . , V5 of QRn and set (n,Z,Q, V1, . . . , V5) as a public key
of the Camenisch-Lysyanskaya signature scheme.
(4) Generate a safe prime p = 2q+1, where q is also a prime, and pick a generator g of
the subgroup Gq of order q of Z∗p.
(5) Set the key pair of the bank as (skB , pkB) = (a, (q, g, n, Z,Q, V1, . . . , V5)).
(6) Send (register, sid , pkB) to FREG and output (setupend, sid).
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3.2. Withdraw Phase
The (withdraw, sid) command is issued by the human user through the dedicated in-
terface to SE , e.g. by selecting the desired amount of coins to be retrieved using the
increase/decrease buttons and confirming the transaction by pushing the withdraw
button. On input (withdraw, sid), SE executes the following steps:
Step 1. H and SE jointly compute a commitment A to the wallet secrets (u, s, t).
(1) Continue only if sid = (B, sid ′).
(2) If pkB is not stored, SE sends (retrieve, sid) to FREG and waits for a message
(retrieve, sid , pkB) from FREG.
(3) If (skU , pkU ) is not stored, SE picks a secret key skU = u ∈R Zq, computes a public
key pkU = gu and sends (register,U , pkU ) to FREG.
(4) SE randomly picks v′ ∈R [1...bn4 c] and s′ ∈R Z∗q , computes A′′ = V u1 V s
′
2 Q
v′ mod n,
and sends A′′ to H through FSMT.
(5) H picks t ∈R Z∗q , computes A′ = A′′V t3 mod n, and sends A′ to B through FSMT.
(6) If pkU is not stored, B sends (retrieve,U) to FREG and waits for a message
(retrieve,U , pkU ) from FREG.
(7) B picks r′ ∈R Z∗q , computes A = A′V r
′
2 mod n, and sends r′ and a nonce ni ∈R
{0, 1}lH to H through FSMT.
(8) H computes A = A′V r′2 = V u1 V s2 V t3Qv
′
mod n, and sends (A, r′) to SE through
FSMT.
(9) SE computes s = s′ + r′ and stores (s,A).
Step 2. H, SE , and B engage in a protocol to obtain B’s blind signature on (u, s, t).
From points 1 to 4, H and SE jointly compute the following zero-knowledge proof of
knowledge:
ZKPK { (u, s, t, v′) : pku = gu ∧ A = V u1 V s2 V t3Qv
′ ∧
u, s, t ∈ {0, 1}lx+lφ+lH ∧ v′ ∈ {0, 1}ly+lφ+lH },
which is verified by B in point 5 below.
(1) SE randomly picks ru, rs ∈R {0, 1}lx+lφ+lH and rv′ ∈R {0, 1}ly+lφ+lH , computes T ′A =
V ru1 V
rs
2 Q
rv′ mod n and TU = gru mod p, and sends (T ′A, TU ) to H through FSMT.
(2) H picks rt ∈R {0, 1}lx+lφ+lH , computes TA = T ′AV rt3 mod n and sequentially com-
putes Sx = n‖V1‖V2‖V3‖Q‖A and c′ = H(Sx‖TA‖TU‖ni), and sends c′ to SE through
FSMT.
(3) SE picks nt ∈ {0, 1}lφ , computes c = H(c′‖nt), calculates su = ru− cu, sv′ = rv′ − cv′
and ss = rs − cs, and sends (c, nt, su, ss, sv′) to H through FSMT.
(4) H computes st = rt − ct and sends (c, nt, su, sv′ , ss, st) to B through FSMT.
(5) B checks whether su, ss, st ∈ {0, 1}lx+lH+lφ and sv′ ∈ {0, 1}ly+lH+lφ , computes the
values T˜A = AcV su1 V
ss
2 V
st
3 Q
sv′ mod n and T˜U = pkcugsu mod p, and checks if c =
H(H(Sx‖T˜A‖T˜U‖ni)‖nt).
(6) B computes e ∈R [2le−1, 2le−1 + 2l′e−1], v′′ ∈ {0, 1}lv and d = ( ZAQv′′ )
1
e mod n, and
sends (d, e, v′′) to H through FSMT.
(7) H checks whether e ∈ [2le−1, 2le−1 + 2l′e−1] and Z = AQv′′de mod n, stores (J =
2L, d, e), and sends (d, e, v′′, t, J) to SE through FSMT.
(8) SE calculates v = v′ + v′′, checks the signature (d, e, v), and stores the wallet W =
(u, s, t, σB(u, s, t), J).
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Step 3. SE sends a confirmation message directly to B through FSMT, increments a
counter w of the number of wallets it stores, initializes to 0 a counter J of the coins
spent in wallet w, and outputs (withdrawend, sid , w). B withdraws 2L coins from U ’s
account and outputs (withdrawend, sid ,SE). If this confirmation message is not received,
B blocks U ’s account. This prevents a malicious H from withdrawing more wallets that
later on are not handed to SE .
3.3. Spend Phase
On input (spend, sid , w,M), SE starts the following protocol which we subdivide into 3
steps.
Step 1. SE andH compute a coin’s serial number S and double-spending tag T , along
with commitments needed to check the correctness of both S and T .
(1) SE continues only if sid = (B, sid ′) and if it stores a wallet w.
(2) SE increments the counter J for wallet w and continues only if J ≤ N , where N is
the number of coins in a wallet.
(3) SE picks ρ6 ∈R [1...bn4 c], computes B = V u4 V ρ65 mod n and S = g1/(J+s) = g(J+s)
−1
mod p, and sends (B,S, J) to H through FSMT.
(4) H sends a spend request toM through FASMT.
(5) If (skM , pkM ) are not stored, M picks a secret key skM = v ∈R Zq, computes a
public key pkM = gv, stores (skM , pkM ), and sends (register,M, pkM ) to FREG.
(6) M picks a unique transaction identifier idtrans ∈R {0, 1}lH and a nonce ni ∈R
{0, 1}lH and sends it to H through FASMT.
(7) If pkM is not stored, H sends (retrieve,M) to FREG and waits for a message
(retrieve,M, pkM ) from FREG.
(8) H computes R = H(pkM ||idtrans) and wi for i = 1...4 such that
∑4
i=1 wi =
J21 − (J − J0)2, picks ρi ∈R [1...bn4 c] for i = 0...4, computes T = pkugR/(J+t) mod p
and Wi = V wi4 V
ρi
5 mod n for i = 1...4, computes AJ = V J4 V
ρ0
5 mod n, and stores
(S, T,AJ , B,W1, ...,W4).
Step 2. SE and H compute jointly the following zero-knowledge proof of knowledge
φ and send it toM.
ZKPK { (u, s, t, J, vB , e, α, w1, ..., w4, ρ0, ..., ρ7) :
Z = QvBV u1 V
s
2 V
t
3 d
e
B ∧ AJ = V J4 V ρ05 ∧ g = S(J+s) ∧
Wi = V
wi
4 V
ρi
5 ; i = 1...4 ∧ B = V u4 V ρ65 ∧
V
(J21−J20 )
4 = (AJV
−2J0
4 )
J(
∏4
i=1W
wi
i )V
ρ5
5 ∧
1 = BJBtV −α4 V
ρ7
5 ∧ u, s, t ∈ {0, 1}lx+lH+lφ ∧
gR = T (J+t)g−α ∧ e ∈ [2le−1, 2le−1 + 2l′e−1] },
with α = u(J + t).
(1) SE executes the following:
(a) Pick randomly ru, rs ∈ {0, 1}lx+lH+lφ , rρ6 ∈ {0, 1}ly+lH+lφ , and rvB ∈
{0, 1}le+ln+lφ+1.
(b) Pick r ∈ {0, 1}ln+lφ .
(c) Compute vB = v + er and dB = dQ−r mod n such that (dB , e, vB) is a random-
ized signature.
(d) Compute T ′Z = V
ru
1 V
rs
2 Q
rvB mod n.
(e) Compute TB = V ru4 V
rρ6
5 mod n.
(f) Compute T ′g = Srs mod p.
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and sends (T ′Z , TB , T ′g, dB) to H through FSMT.
(2) H executes the following:
(a) Pick rt ∈ {0, 1}lx+lH+lφ , re ∈ {0, 1}le+lH+lφ , and rJ ∈ {0, 1}l+lH+lφ .
(b) Pick rρi ∈ {0, 1}ly+lH+lφ , for i = [0, ..., 5, 7].
(c) Pick rwi ∈ {0, 1}l+lφ , for i = [1, ..., 4].
(d) Compute TZ = T ′ZV
rt
3 d
re
B mod n and TAJ = V
rJ
4 V
rρ0
5 mod n.
(e) Compute Tg = T ′gSrJ mod p.
(f) Compute TWi = V
rwi
4 V
rρi
5 mod n, for i = [1, ..., 4].
(g) Compute
T
V
J21−J20
4
= (AJV
−2J0
4 )
rJW
rwi
i V
rρ5
5 mod n, for i = [1, ..., 4].
(h) Compute T1 = BrJ+rtV −rα4 V
rρ7
5 mod n.
(i) Compute TgR = T rJ+rtg−rα mod p.
(j) Compute
SC = Q‖Vi‖dB‖g‖Wk‖AJ‖B‖T , for i = [1, ..., 4] and k = [1, ..., 5].
(k) Compute
TC = TZ‖TAJ‖Tg‖TWi‖T
V
J21−J20
4
‖T1‖TB‖TgR , for i = [1, ..., 4].
H sends c′ = H(SC‖TC‖ni) to SE through FSMT.
(3) SE executes the following:
(a) Pick nt ∈ {0, 1}lH .
(b) Compute c = H(c′‖S‖nt).
(c) Compute su = ru − cu, and svB = rvB − cvB .
(d) Compute ss = rs − cs, and sρ6 = rρ6 − cρ6.
and sends (c, nt, su, ss, svB , sρ6) to H through FSMT.
(4) H executes the following:
(a) Compute st = rt − ct, se = re − ce, and
sJ = rJ − cJ .
(b) Compute sρi = rρi − cρi for i = [0, ..., 5, 7].
(c) Compute swj = rwj − cwj , for i = [1, ..., 4].
(d) Compute sα = rα − cα.
(e) Set sall = (su, ss, st, svB , se, sJ , sρi , sα, swk), for i = [0, ..., 7] and k = [1, ..., 4].
and sends (dB , sall, c, nt) and (S, T,AJ , B,W1, ...,W4) (computed in Step 1) to M
through FASMT.
(5) M verifies the proof as follows:
(a) Compute T˜z = V su1 V
ss
2 V
st
3 d
se
B Z
cQsvB mod n.
(b) Compute T˜AJ = V
sJ
4 V
sρ0
5 A
c
J mod n.
(c) Compute T˜g = SsJ+ssgc mod p.
(d) Compute T˜Wi = V
swi
4 V
sρi
5 W
c
i mod n, for i = [1, ..., 4].
(e) Compute
T˜
V
J21−J20
4
= (AJV
−2J0
4 )
sJW
swi
i V
ρ5
5 V
(J21−J20 )c
4 mod n, for i = [1, ..., 4].
(f) Compute T˜B = V su4 V
sρ6
5 B
c mod n and T˜1 = BsJ+stV −sα4 V
sρ7
5 mod n.
(g) Compute T˜gR = T (sJ+st)g−sαgRc mod p.
(h) Compute S˜C = Q‖Vi‖dB‖g‖Wk‖AJ‖B‖T , for i = [1, ..., 5] and k = [1, ..., 4].
(i) Compute
T˜c = T˜Z‖T˜A‖T˜g‖T˜Wi‖T˜
V
J21−J20
4
‖T˜B‖T˜1‖T˜gR , for i = [1, ..., 4].
(j) Check c = H(H(S˜c‖T˜c‖ni)‖S‖nt).
(k) Check su, ss, st ∈ {0, 1}lx+lH+lφ and
se ∈ {0, 1}le+lH+lφ .
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M stores the coin (S,R, T, φ).
Step 3. M signs (S,R) using skM , sends the signature to H through FASMT and
outputs (spendend, sid , S,R). H verifies the signature, sends the signature, idtrans and
R to SE through FSMT and outputs (spendend, sid , S,R). If pkM is not stored, SE re-
trieves pkM through FREG, verifies the signature, and checks that R contains pkM . If
the checks verify, SE outputs (spendend, sid , S,R). If SE does not output anything, the
human user knows that either the host prevented the merchant from retrieving the
coin, or the merchant does not acknowledge reception of the coin.
3.4. Deposit Phase
On input (deposit, sid , S,R),M sends the coin (S,R, T, φ) to B through FSMT. B verifies
φ. If S and R are not fresh, B outputs (depositend, sid ,M, S,R,ddepositalert). If S is
not fresh, let (S,R, T, φ) and (S,R′, T ′, φ′) be two coins with the same S. Identify the
double-spender as follows
(
TR12
TR21
)(R1−R2)
−1
= (
guR1+R1R2(J2+S)
guR2+R1R2(J1+S)
)(R1−R2)
−1
= gu
B retrieves the identity U associated with public key gu and outputs (depositend, sid ,
M,U , S,R,dspentalert). If S is fresh, B stores (S,R, T, φ) and outputs the message
(depositend, sid ,M, S, id) to B.
3.5. Accuse Phase
On input (accuse, sid ,U , S,R,R′), P retrieves two coins (S,R, T, φ) and (S,R′, T ′, φ′)
with the same S. P verifies φ and φ′ and checks that R 6= R′. If it is the case, the
value gu can be computed as in the deposit phase. If the user U is associated with the
public key gu, P outputs (accuseend, sid , guilty). Otherwise, it outputs (accuseend, sid ,
notguilty).
4. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF OUR CONSTRUCTION
To prove that our protocol securely realizes the ideal functionality FASEC, we have to
show that for any environment Z and any adversaryA there exists a simulator S, such
that Z cannot distinguish whether it is interacting with A and the protocol in the real
world or with S and FASEC. The simulator thereby plays the role of all honest parties
in the real world and interacts with FASEC for all corrupt parties in the ideal world.
The security analysis where both the secure element SE and the host H are corrupt
follows the security analysis given in [Camenisch et al. 2005] for the case where the
user U is corrupt. Similarly, the security analysis where both the secure element SE
and the host H are honest, but some merchants M and/or the bank B are corrupt,
follows the security analysis given in [Camenisch et al. 2005] when U is honest. We
note that our protocol modifies the way U does computations internally by splitting U
into the secure element SE and the host H, but the view of the protocol given to the
merchants and the bank is equivalent to the situation where U is not split up.
Moreover, the security analysis when SE is corrupt andH is honest is not of practical
interest. In our model, we assume tamper-resistant secure elements SE and therefore
we assume that an adversary able to corrupt the secure element also corrupts H.
We must therefore analyse the security of our protocol when the secure elements
SE1, . . . ,SEI are honest but (a subset of) the hosts H1, . . . ,HI are corrupt, and the
bank B and (a subset of) the merchants M1, . . . ,MJ are either honest or corrupt. As
described in Section 2, when H is corrupt, the anonymity property does not hold any-
more for the respective secure element. Therefore, we can simplify our analysis by
considering only one secure element SE and one host H. We note that considering the
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collusion of several corrupted hosts against the bank and the merchant is not needed
since this analysis, as mentioned above, is described in [Camenisch et al. 2005] for a
collusion of fully corrupt users.
Because of space limitations, we give a detailed security proof for the case where the
host is corrupt but the secure element, the bank and the merchants are honest. The
case where the host and some merchants are corrupt is similar, i.e., the proof that a
corrupt host and merchant cannot withdraw and spend coins without the secure ele-
ment’s authorization follows the proof where only the host is corrupt. The difference
is that a corrupt merchant may not acknowledge reception of the coin in Step 3 of
the spend protocol, in which case the human user detects that no confirmation was
received. The case where the host and the bank are corrupt is also similar. The proof
that a corrupt bank cannot accuse an honest user of coin double-spending is also based
on the inability of the adversary to spend coins without the secure element’s autho-
rization.
THEOREM 4.1. When the host is corrupt, our e-cash scheme realizes FASEC in
the FREG, FSMT and FASMT-hybrid model and in the random oracle model un-
der the discrete logarithm assumption, the hiding property of the Damgaard-
Fujisaki [Damga˚rd and Fujisaki 2002] commitment scheme, the unforgeability of the
Camenisch-Lysyanskaya [Camenisch and Lysyanskaya 2001] signature scheme and the
pseudorandomness of the Dodis-Yampolskiy [Dodis and Yampolskiy 2005] pseudoran-
dom function.
In our proof, we need to rewind the adversary. Therefore, we do not prove security in
the universal composability framework.
We will show by means of a series of hybrid games that the environment Z cannot
distinguish between his view of the real world protocol and his view of the ideal world
protocol with non-negligible probability. The first game corresponds to the real world
protocol, while the last game corresponds to the ideal world protocol. We denote by
Pr [Game i] the probability that the environment distinguishes Game i from the real
world protocol, and for each game Game i, we show that |Pr [Game i]−Pr [Game i−1]|
is negligible.
—Game 0: This game corresponds to the execution of the real-world protocol. In
Game 0, the random oracle queries sent by the adversary are replied with consis-
tent random values, i.e., equal queries are answered with the same value. Therefore,
Pr [Game 0] = 0.
—Game 1: Game 1 follows Game 0, except that Game 1 replaces Step 2.1, Step 2.2
and Step 2.3 of the withdraw phase by the following:
(1)Game 1 picks a random challenge c, picks random su, ss ∈R {0, 1}lx+lφ+lH and
sv′ ∈R {0, 1}ly+lφ+lH , and computes T ′A = (A/V t3 )cV su1 V ss2 Qsv′ mod n and TU =
(pkU )
cgsu mod p. (We note that Game 1 can calculate V t3 = A′/A′′ in Step 1.7 of
the withdraw phase.)
(2) A random oracle query (Sx‖TA‖TU‖ni) is stored and answered with a consistent
random value c′.
(3)Game 1 picks nt ∈ {0, 1}lφ , assigns c to the random oracle query (c′‖nt), and
sends (c, nt, su, ss, sv′).
Game 1 shows that, in the random oracle model, the secure element SE is able to
simulate the proof computed in Step 2 of the withdrawal protocol, i.e., the secure
element can compute the proof without knowledge of the secret values (u, s, v′). We
show that |Pr [Game 1]− Pr [Game 0]| = 0.
PROOF. The values (T ′A, TU ), as well as (nt, su, ss, sv′), are equally distributed
in Game 1 and Game 0. Additionally, the zero-knowledge proof of knowl-
A:15
edge sent to the bank in Step 2 of Game 1 still verifies correctly. For TU ,
it is clear that the value computed in Game 1 equals the verification value.
For TA, we have that, if the corrupt host followed the protocol specifica-
tion, TA = T ′AV
rt
3 = (A/V
t
3 )
cV su1 V
ss
2 Q
sv′V rt3 , and the verifier of the proof
computes T˜A = AcV su1 V
ss
2 V
st
3 Q
sv′ mod n = (A)cV su1 V
ss
2 V
rt−ct
3 Q
sv′ mod n =
(A)cV su1 V
ss
2 Q
sv′V −ct3 V
rt
3 = (A/V
t
3 )
cV su1 V
ss
2 Q
sv′V rt3 .
—Game 2: Game 2 follows Game 1, except that Game 2 replaces Step 2.1 of the spend
phase by the following:
(1) Pick randomly su, ss ∈ {0, 1}lx+lH+lφ , sρ6 ∈ {0, 1}ly+lH+lφ , and svB ∈
{0, 1}le+ln+lφ+1 and a random oracle response c.
(2) Pick r ∈ {0, 1}ln+lφ .
(3) Compute dB = Qr mod n.
(4) Compute T ′Z = (AQv
′′
/V t3 )
cV su1 V
ss
2 Q
svB mod n. (We note that Game 1 can cal-
culate V t3 = A′/A′′ in Step 1.7 of the withdraw phase.)
(5) Compute TB = (B)cV su4 V
sρ6
5 mod n.
(6) Compute T ′g = (g)cSss mod p.
In Step 2.2, the random oracle queries (SC‖TC‖ni) are replied with a consistent
random value. Game 2 also replaces Step 2.3 of the spend phase by the following:
(1) Pick nt ∈ {0, 1}lH .
(2) Set c to be the answer of the random oracle query (c′‖S‖nt).
(3) Send (c, nt, su, ss, svB , sρ6) to the corrupt host.
Game 2 shows that, in the random oracle model, the secure element SE is able to
simulate the proof computed in Step 2 of the spend protocol, i.e., the secure element
can compute the proof without knowledge of the secret values (u, s, v, ρ6). For brevity,
we omit a proof that |Pr [Game 2] − Pr [Game 1]| = 0 since it is based on the same
idea as the proof of indistinguishability between Game 1 and Game 0.
—Game 3: Game 3 follows Game 2, except that Game 3 does the following changes
in Step 1 of the withdraw phase:
— Step 1.3: If (skU , pkU ) is not stored, Game 3 computes a public key pkU by picking
a random element of Gq.
— Step 1.4: Game 3 picks a random element A′′ in QRn and sends A′′ to the corrupt
host H through FSMT.
— Step 1.7: Game 3 sets V t3 = A′/A′′, picks r′ ∈R Z∗q , and sends r′ and a nonce
ni ∈R {0, 1}lH to the corrupt H.
— Step 1.9: Game 3 stores A = A′V r′2 .
Additionally, Game 3 does the following changes in Step 1 of the spend phase:
— Step 1.3: Game 3 picks a random element B from QRn and a random element S
of Gq and sends (B,S, J) to H.
We note that, at this point, the secure element does not know any of the secret
values (u, s, v, ρ6). The proofs computed in Step 2 of the withdraw phase and in Step
3 of the spend phase are now simulated proofs of a false statement. We show that
|Pr [Game 3]− Pr [Game 2]| is negligible.
PROOF. The public key pkU is equally distributed in Game 2 and in Game 3. The
value A′′ corresponds to a Damgaard-Fujisaki commitment [Damga˚rd and Fujisaki
2002] to u with randomness s′ and v′. Therefore, under the hiding property of this
commitment scheme, it is not possible to distinguish A′′ from a random value. The
value B is also a Damgaard-Fujisaki commitment to u with randomness ρ6. The
value S is an evaluation of the Dodis-Yampolskiy pseudorandom function [Dodis and
Yampolskiy 2005] for key s and input J . Therefore, under the pseudorandomness of
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this function, it is indistinguishable from a random value. Therefore, Game 2 and
Game 3 are indistinguishable with overwhelming probability.
—Game 4: Game 4 follows Game 3, except that, if in Step 2.4 of the withdraw phase,
the corrupt H sends a proof (c, nt, su, sv′ , ss, st) such that the proof verifies correctly
but any of the values (su, sv′ , ss) was not sent before to the corrupt H for the proof
with challenge c and nonce nt, Game 4 extracts any of the respective secrets u, v′
and s. We show that extraction works in the random oracle model and, therefore,
|Pr [Game 4]− Pr [Game 3]| is negligible.
PROOF. First, we note that there must be an oracle query (c′‖nt) whose output
was c. Otherwise, in the random oracle model, if no query (c′‖nt) is recorded, then
a new random value would be assigned to that query which would equal c with
negligible probability, and thus the proof would not verify correctly.
Given (c′‖nt), the extractor identifies the random oracle query (Sx‖TA‖TU‖ni) from
the corrupt host whose output was c′. This oracle query must also exist, since oth-
erwise when the proof is verified another value different from c′ would be assigned
with overwhelming probability, and thus the proof would not be correct.
After identifying the oracle query (Sx‖TA‖TU‖ni), the extractor rewinds the cor-
rupt host to the point where this oracle query was made and replies it with a
different random value c′1. Then the extractor sets a value c1 6= c for the oracle
query (c′1‖nt). Finally, the corrupt host sends a proof (c1, nt, su, sv′ , ss, st). Let, for
instance, su be the value that was not sent before the corrupt H. Then, given the
proofs (c, nt, su, sv′ , ss, st) and (c1, nt, su1, sv′ , ss, st), the extractor can extract the se-
cret value u by computing u = (su − su1)/(c1 − c). The other secret values can be
extracted in the same way.
—Game 5: Game 5 follows Game 4, except that, if in Step 2.4 of the withdraw phase,
the corrupt H sends a proof (dB , c, nt, su, ss, st, svB , se, sJ , sρi , sα, swk) for i = [0, ..., 7]
and k = [1, ..., 4] such that the proof verifies correctly but any of the values s∗ was
not sent before to the corrupt H for the proof with challenge c and nonce nt, Game 5
extracts any of the secrets ∗. Similarly to Game 4, extraction works in the random
oracle model and, therefore, |Pr [Game 5] − Pr [Game 4]| is negligible. The proof
follows the proof in Game 4.
—Game 6: Game 6 follows Game 5, except that, if in Step 2.4 of the withdraw phase,
the corrupt H sends a proof (c, nt, su, sv′ , ss, st) such that the proof verifies correctly
but any of the values (su, sv′ , ss) was not sent before to the corrupt H for the proof
with challenge c and nonce nt, Game 6 aborts. We show that Game 6 aborts with
negligible probability, and thus |Pr [Game 6]−Pr [Game 5]| is negligible. This proves
that the host cannot withdraw coins without the help of the secure element.
PROOF. We show that, if there is a corrupt host that makes Game 6 abort with
non-negligible probability, we can make a reduction to break the discrete logarithm
problem or the hiding property of the Damgaard-Fujisaki commitment scheme.
In the first case, the challenger sends a pair (g, pkU ), which the reduction uses to
set the g value in the bank’s public key and the user’s public key. If the corrupt host
sends a proof (c, nt, su, sv′ , ss, st) where su was not sent before to the corrupt host,
then the reduction runs the extractor to obtain u and sends u to the challenger as
the discrete logarithm of pkU with respect to g.
In the second case, the challenger sends commitment parameters (V1, V2, Q), which
the reduction uses to set those values in the bank’s public key, and the commitment
value A′′, which the reduction uses to set A′′ in Step 1.4 of the withdraw protocol.
If the corrupt host sends a proof (c, nt, su, sv′ , ss, st) where su, sv′ or ss was not sent
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before to the corrupt host, the reduction uses the extractor to get u, v′, or s, which
violates the hiding property of the commitment scheme.
—Game 7: Game 7 follows Game 6, except that, if in Step 2.4 of the withdraw phase,
the corrupt H sends a proof (dB , c, nt, su, ss, st, svB , se, sJ , sρi , sα, swk) for i = [0, ..., 7]
and k = [1, ..., 4] such that the proof verifies correctly but any of the values s∗ was
not sent before to the corrupt H for the proof with challenge c and nonce nt, Game 7
aborts. The proof that |Pr [Game 7]− Pr [Game 6]| is negligible follows the proof in
Game 6. Basically, the reduction employs the extractor to get the secret values and
then break the hiding property of the commitment scheme, the pseudorandomness
of the pseudorandom function or the unforgeability of the banks signature scheme.
This proves that the host cannot spend coins without the help of the secure element.
Game 7 produces the same distribution as our simulator S, which we describe now:
— On input (setupend, sid) from FASEC, S runs a copy of an honest bank on input
(setup, sid).
— On input (withdraw, sid) from FASEC, S sends (withdraw, sid) to FASEC. If FASEC does
not send a subsequent message (withdraw, sid ,SE i), FASEC runs the withdraw phase
between a copy of an honest bank and a copy of an honest user (secure element
and host) to simulate the withdraw phase towards the adversary. If FASEC sends
(withdraw, sid ,SE i), then S interacts with the adversary by simulating the secure
element and the bank sides of the withdraw phase. This simulation employs the
changes described until Game 7. If the withdraw phase was completed successfully,
S sends (withdraw, sid , 1) to FASEC, else S sends (withdraw, sid , 0) to FASEC.
— On input (spend, sid) from FASEC, S sends (spend, sid) to FASEC. If FASEC does not
send a subsequent message (spend, sid ,SE i), S runs a copy of an honest user (secure
element and host) and an honest merchant to simulate a spend phase towards the
adversary. If If FASEC sends (spend, sid ,SE i), S interacts with the adversary by sim-
ulating the secure element and the merchant sides of the spend phase. This simula-
tion employs the changes described until Game 7. If the spend phase was completed
successfully, S sets b = 1 else b = 0. If the adversary reveals the identity of the se-
cure element in a message to the merchant, then S sets c = 0 else c = 1. S sends
(spend, sid , b, c) to FASEC.
— On input (deposit, sid) from FASEC, S runs a copy of an honest merchant and an
honest bank to simulate a deposit phase towards the adversary. If the deposit phase
is completed successfully, S sends (deposit, sid) to FASEC.
5. PROOF-OF-CONCEPT IMPLEMENTATION
In this section we provide an illustrative implementation of our proposed anonymous
split E-cash scheme. The goal of this section is not to develop a SE that satisfies all
conditions of our scheme, but rather to be able to evaluate the complexity of the pro-
tocol on the user’s side. To this end, we focus on the computation and communication
demands of the SE . We assume other characteristics relevant to the security of the sys-
tem, e.g. enabling an interface between SE and the human user, would be presented in
a real-world deployment.
We begin by enumerating the hardware components used in the implementation,
providing a motivation of our choices. We then identify and describe the bottlenecks
encountered on the user side and propose solutions to overcome (or minimize) them.
In the last parts of the section we present and discuss the performance results.
A first critical choice for the implementation consists in defining a set of secure
parameter lengths for the cryptographic primitives. Figure 2 depicts our selection.
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n : 1024 bits ly : 1022 bits l : 10 bits
p : 512 bits lH : 120 bits le : 513 bits
lx : 511 bits lφ : 80 bits
Fig. 2. Parameter lengths of our implementation.
5.1. Platform Choices
Motivated by the availability of open and powerful development tools, we have decided
to implement the host on an Android-based smartphone1. We have selected the rather
modest Motorola Milestone, which comes equipped with a 600 MHz ARM Cortex-A8
processor and runs an Android v2.2 operating system. Our host implementation is
written in Java language and therefore can be easily ported to other devices. We have
employed three classes directly available in the Java API: the BigInteger class for large
integer arithmetic, the MessageDigest class for hash functions, and the Random class
for random number generation.
Enabling full hardware-based security in our system requires a SE as described in
Section 2. The SE is composed of two main components: a trusted execution platform
and a physical interface to the human user. Driven by our goal to evaluate the perfor-
mance of our E-Cash proposal, we have opted not to develop such a complete token. In-
stead, we have focused on what we believe is the main interest of the proof-of-concept,
i.e. determining the computational demands that are placed in the trusted execution
platform.
We have selected the Mobile Security Card (MSC) manufactured by Giesecke & De-
vrient (G&D), a secure element that can be internally plugged into the phone. The
MSC is to the best of our knowledge the only option to openly support hardware-based
security on Android platforms [SEEK 2014], and has certain properties that make it
quite suitable to our envisioned anonymous split E-Cash application. First and most
important, it embeds a certified smart card chip containing 72 kB of EEPROM and
1.4 kB of RAM secured (among others) against DPA/SPA physical attacks [Kocher
et al. 1999]. Second, the MSC supports both Java Card 2.2.1 and Global Platform 2.1.1
APIs, making our implementation portable to any other compliant device. Third, it
features multiple cryptographic hardware accelerators for hash functions as well as
symmetric and asymmetric encryption algorithms. And fourth, the MSC is physically
manufactured as a microSD card easy to interface to multiple mobile platforms such
as our Motorola Milestone smartphone.
The bank and merchant are less strict in terms of hardware requirements and we
implement them on a generic PC platform for the sake of completeness. Note that
neither the functionality of the bank nor the merchant are the bottleneck of our
scheme. Consequently, we will not detail these implementations in the rest of this
section.
Communication. The MSC offers two standardized smart card communication inter-
faces. Communication between the Android phone (H) and the MSC Java Card (SE)
proceeds in a master-slave fashion as described in the ISO 7816-3 standard [ISO 7816-
3 2006]. Android phone (master) and Java Card (slave) communicate by exchanging
Application Protocol Data Units (APDUs), the format of which is described in ISO
7816-4 [ISO 7816-4 2005]. The phone is always the first to send an APDU command
to the Java Card, which performs some computations upon reception of the command,
1http://developer.android.com/sdk/index.html
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and ultimately sends an APDU response back to the phone. The communication inter-
face supports data transfer rates of 9 600 bps.
For usability reasons, the communication between U and external entities (B andM)
should proceed over a contactless channel. Our initial goal was to employ NFC but at
the time of the implementation we were unable to find an Android smartphone phone
that supported NFC development while also having a microSD card slot compatible
with the MSC. Due to this - and despite being the most attractive choice in terms of
compatibility with existing payment infrastructure -, we had to discard this option. For
the sake of developing a functional proof-of-concept with involvement of all entities, we
decided to employ Bluetooth communication channels.
5.2. Optimization Strategies
In this subsection we go over a few of the design steps followed during our implemen-
tation of the user side operations. In particular, we identify implementation issues or
bottlenecks and then propose how these can be optimized. Given that the host is a
relatively powerful device that eases implementation efforts, in the following we only
address the issues regarding to the most resource constrained element, i.e. the Java
Card. Note that most of the following strategies are not exclusive of our implementa-
tion and can be ported to other systems employing similar hardware targets.
Issue 1. RAM restrictions
PROBLEM DEFINITION. Our MSC Java Card has only 1.4 kB of RAM available to
our applet for temporary variable storage. Given that most of the operands in our
scheme instantiation are 1024 bits or larger, careful memory planning is key to the
implementation feasibility.
PROPOSED SOLUTION. A total of three different but related optimizations have been
carried out. First, instead of using one array for each stored variable we have reserved
a single big memory block. This allows us to reduce memory overheads due to multiple
declarations, i.e. as every object in Java is required to have a header, employing a
single large array saves multiple memory bytes. Second, we ensured that the link to
old objects is never lost. Note that as Java does not have a garbage collector, previous
memory space is used when a link is lost. And third, we can extend the RAM space by
using the APDU buffer as RAM memory. Although this allows to slightly increase the
RAM memory with 256 bytes, it is important to only store non confidential information
in the buffer, as it can be read by other untrusted applications or devices interfacing
the MSC.
A:20
Issue 2. Generation and Storage of Random Numbers
PROBLEM DEFINITION. As most privacy-preserving protocols, our anonymous split
E-cash scheme requires the generation of multiple large random numbers during its
operations. For zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge these random numbers need to be
used twice - once at the beginning (commitment phase) and once at the end (opening
phase) - which means they need to be temporarily stored in memory. As our implemen-
tation already deals with memory restrictions, the use of RAM to store these numbers
is not a realistic option. Employing EEPROM on the other hand would not only be
slower, but we face its limitation on the number of allowed write operations. It is thus
not only crucial to find an efficient way to generate randomness, but also figure out a
way to store it on the device when it needs to be employed more than once.
PROPOSED SOLUTION. The solution we have devised is based on the observation
that the reused random numbers follow the same sequence as when they are gen-
erated, i.e. if a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge requires to generate ten random
numbers during the commitment phase, the same ten random numbers will be used
in the same order during the opening phase.
Based on this we have decided to generate these random numbers by means of a
Pseudo Random Number Generator (PRNG). The pseudo random sequence output of
a PRNG is completely determined by its input initial values, namely the PRNG’s seed.
Our approach consists in generating a random seed - using the random class in the
Java API - at the beginning of the withdraw or spend protocols. The value of the seed
is stored in RAM for the rest of the protocol execution. From that moment on, all
random numbers in the implementation that will be later reused are generated using
the PRNG. Once the implementation reaches the point in which reuse starts, e.g. the
opening phase of the zero-knowledge proof of knowledge, we reset the PRNG with the
seed stored in RAM. This allows us to regenerate the random numbers in the same
sequence as they were first created and use them on-the-fly without storing them in
memory.
We have implemented the NIST recommended X9.31 PRNG, as depicted in Figure 3.
The inputs v and ctn correspond to the PRNG’s seed, while i is an intermediate variable
and r holds the output value. At each iteration the following operations are carried out:
i = EK(ctn),
r = Ek(i⊕ v),
v = EK(r ⊕ i),
ctn = ctn+ 1,
where EK denotes a block cipher employing a secret key K. In our implementation
we instantiate EK by using AES-256 [197 2001], whose functionality is directly avail-
able via a hardware co-processor.
Issue 3. Large Integer Arithmetic
PROBLEM DEFINITION. Our scheme employs large integers with a length in the or-
der of 1024 bits and executes multiple operations such as (modular) additions, (modu-
lar) subtractions, (modular) multiplications, or (multi-base) modular exponentiations.
The Java Card 2.2.1 standard does not provide direct support for such operations and
consequently we are forced to develop our own routines from scratch.
PROPOSED SOLUTIONS. We have created a customized Java class to perform all re-
quired large integer arithmetic. Our implementation of (modular) additions and (mod-
ular) subtractions follows traditional ‘pencil and paper’ algorithms, as found for in-
stance in [Menezes et al. 1996]. These routines are developed purely in Java and oper-
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Fig. 3. NIST recommended X9.31 pseudo random number generator.
ate on the input operands word by word starting from the least significant position. As
will be further shown in Sect. 5.3 software based routines perform extremely poorly on
Java Cards. Consequently one needs to look for alternative mechanisms when imple-
menting even more costly operations such as multiplications or exponentiations.
Techniques to speed up arithmetic on Java Cards have been presented in [Sterckx
et al. 2009; Bichsel et al. 2009]. Their core idea is to take advantage of the fast crypto-
graphic co-processors to perform arithmetic operations. Modular exponentiations can
be straightforwardly carried out for instance by using the RSA co-processor in the
RSA NOPAD mode which computes me mod n. There is but one limitation that needs to
be handled: the co-processor requires that e and n are of the same size, which is not
always the case in our protocol in which the exponent has often more bits than the
modulus.
A workaround to this issue is to split the exponent e in two smaller components e1, e2
such that:
e = e22
|n|−1 + e1,
where |n| indicates the bit-size of n. The modular exponentiation can be then computed
with three calls to the RSA co-processor as follows:
me mod n = me22
|n|−1+e1 mod n
= me22
|n|−1
me1 mod n
= (me2 mod n)2
|n|−1
me1 mod n.
Finally, modular multiplications are also implemented such that they can make use
of the RSA co-processor. In this case we take advantage of the fact that multiplication
can be performed via exponentiations as follows:
ab mod n =
(a+ b)2 − a2 − b2
2
mod n.
Although the previous equation might seem rather complex, computing multiplica-
tions in this way is almost 4 times faster than implementing the traditional ‘pencil and
paper’ algorithm purely in Java.
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Operation and length of operands (in bytes) Timing
MODULAR MULTI-EXPONENTIATION: Ge11 G
e2
2 G
e3
3 mod n
n = G1 = G2 = G3 = 128, e1 = e2 = 94, e3 = 158 6231 ms
n = G1 = G2 = G3 = 128, e1 = e2 = 64, e3 = 128 3856 ms
MODULAR EXPONENTIATION: ge mod n
n = g = e = 64 270 ms
n = g = 64, e = 94 1670 ms
n = g = 128, e = 158 4116 ms
RANDOM NUMBER GENERATION (NIST PRNG): r ∈ {0, 1}
r = 10 120 ms
r = 64 252 ms
r = 128 480 ms
RANDOM NUMBER GENERATION (JAVA CARD PRNG): r ∈ {0, 1}
r = 10 120 ms
r = 64 130 ms
r = 128 160 ms
OPENING OPERATION IN ZKPK: ri − ci
ri = 158, c = 20, i = 128 2634 ms
ri = 94, c = 20, i = 64 2143 ms
ADDITION: a+ b
a = b = 64 181 ms
a = b = 128 341 ms
HASH FUNCTION: H(x)
x = 30 125 ms
x = 94 130 ms
MODULAR MULTIPLICATION: ab mod n
a = b = n = 64 1382 ms
a = b = n = 128 1652 ms
Fig. 4. Response time of basic operations performed in the MSC secure element.
5.3. Performance Evaluation
We depict in Figure 4 the timings obtained by running some arithmetic and crypto-
graphic operations in the MSC. As expected both modular multiplication and expo-
nentiation operations yield the highest timings, i.e. for 1024 bit operands a modular
multiplication requires 1.5 seconds and a modular exponentiation consumes slightly
more than 4 seconds. The generation of random numbers using the NIST PRNG is
slightly larger than using the Java random routine. Perhaps more interesting is the
fact that a modular addition with 1024 bit operands requires 341 ms. In other words,
the time to perform five modular additions is the same as one modular multiplication,
which exemplifies the poor performance of arithmetic software routines on our Java
Card based platform.
The global results for an execution of the main protocols on the user side are depicted
in Table II. The withdraw protocol requires around 20 seconds to complete, whereas the
spend protocol takes around 25 seconds. These results include the communication over-
head between H and SE . As expected, the dominant component of the overall timings
in both cases corresponds to the execution in the constrained SE . Performance on H is
on the other hand rather efficient.
For the sake of completeness, we provide in Table III the amount of data that is
transferred between the participating entities on both withdraw and spend operations.
Recall that in our implementation, the interface between H and SE has a transfer
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Table II. Computation timings for operations on the
user side (including communication).
H SE Total
Withdraw 1.02 s 17.80 s 20 s
Spend 0.15 s 23.34 s 24.90 s
rate of 9 600 bps. Therefore, the communication overhead amounts to 1.18 seconds
and 1.39 seconds, respectively. These timings, which are already included in the last
column of Table II, show that the communication overhead is roughly 6% of the total
execution time.
The communication betweenH and external entities, namely B andM, is envisioned
to take place using NFC, already the interface of choice for several (non-anonymous)
payment systems. The NFC standard defines three different possible bit rates (106,
212 or 424 kbit/s), which can be used to estimate the communication cost in our imple-
mentation. Using the slowest of the three, we obtain an estimated overhead communi-
cation of 75 ms and 207 ms for the withdraw and spend phases, respectively.
Table III. Communication between different entities.
H↔ SE H ↔ B H↔M
Withdraw 11 kbits 8 kbits —
Spend 13 kbits — 22 kbits
5.4. Discussion
The analysis of the results leads to the following interpretation. While the timings
are promising regarding the feasibility and suitability of our approach, a real world
deployment would require a considerable speed up of execution times. Taking into ac-
count that calculations on the MSC have been thoroughly minimized and optimized in
our implementation, the practicality of our system relies on the availability of a more
powerful secure element. In other words, the SE as envisioned in our system cannot be
a direct composition of the MSC and the required LCD/push button interfaces.
We consider two possible options to improve performance results in future work.
The first one consists in exploring other commercially available devices other than the
MSC. The Java Card standard provides only a functional specification of a product.
It is up to the manufacturer to decide how to implement the underlying software or
hardware such that it complies with the standard. As observed in prior works [Sterckx
et al. 2009], the performance of the hardware co-processors between two different Java
Cards can easily vary up to 50%. In other words, a direct porting of our implementation
to another Java Card could well result in significant improvements. Note also that the
new Java Card 2.2.2 en 3.0 standards ensure support for some operations unavailable
to our platform, mainly additions, subtractions, and multiplications. The availability
of a native arithmetic in the Java Card would bring large improvements on most of our
operations. Unreasonably slow computations such as the openings in zero-knowledge
proofs of knowledge si = ri − ci could be performed significantly faster.
The second option we consider is to devise a custom token for the SE . The disad-
vantage of this solution is that it involves costly engineering work and would be more
difficult to prototype than a commercial solution. The main advantage, however, is that
the token could be fully personalized to optimize our E-Cash application. For instance,
dedicated hardware accelerators could be added to the trusted environment in order
to improve current implementation bottlenecks. Moreover, the communication times
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between H and SE would also benefit from this approach. The MSC offers a communi-
cation channel with a limited rate of 9 600 bps. The usage of an external interface as
we envision, for instance based on a USB connector, would make the communication
overhead between H and SE negligible in front of computation time.
6. CONCLUSIONS
In this work we have studied the feasibility of the anonymous E-Cash scheme on mo-
bile scenarios without fully tamper-resistant payment devices. Motivated by existing
MTM non-anonymous payment architectures, we have considered at design time a
payment token composed of an untrusted yet powerful platform connected to a trusted
but rather constrained module. Following this approach, we have devised a protocol
variant that fulfills all common properties of E-cash while relaxing the amount of
trust placed in the payment token. We have evaluated the cost of our proposal on a
proof-of-concept implementation that uses only commercially available platforms, and
proposed possible directions for future work.
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